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Editorial Privilege and the Scope of
Discovery in Sullivan-Rule Libel
Actions
By HOWARD 0. HUNTER*
INTRODUCTION

Th6 war in Vietnam was the source of a great deal of social,
political, and legal controversy. The impact of that war on our
society was significant and substantial, but most students of
the experience would probably not have predicted that the
war's events would produce a lawsuit' that could have a significant effect on the common law tort of defamation. The intriguing saga of Lt. Colonel Anthony Herbert, however, set the stage
for the decision of a case that was almost as important to libel
litigants as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v.

3
Robert Welch, Inc.

I.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Lt. Colonel Anthony Herbert was a highly decorated Army
veteran in 1969 when he took command in Vietnam of the
Second Battalion, 173rd Airborne Brigade. Herbert had joined
the Army when he was seventeen, had seen a great deal of
action in Korea, had been chosen to go on a goodwill tour as
an example of one of the Army's finest soldiers, had been an
instructor in the Army's prestigious Ranger School, had been
qualified as a member of the elite Special Forces ("Green Berets"), and had received almost perfect efficiency reports. His
advancement from raw recruit to field grade officer had been
extraordinarily rapid. To all outward appearances, it was a
surprise when General John Barnes, Commander of the 173rd,
* B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale University. Associate Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Floyd Abrams and the firm of
Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, New York, for providing him with copies of the principal
briefs filed in the Herbert v. Lando litigation and his two research assistants, John C.
Harrison and Rosalyn Kohen, for their help.
I Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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relieved Herbert of his command on April 4, 1969. 4 Herbert
appealed the decision to Army Headquarters in Saigon, and
officers there considered the matter serious enough to conduct
a full scale investigation. Upon the completion of the investigation, the decision was affirmed and Colonel Herbert was posted
back to the United States. 5 Following his dismissal from the
173rd Airborne Brigade, Colonel Ross Franklin, Deputy Commander of the 173rd and Herbert's immediate superior, filed a
poor efficiency rating on Herbert.6 Subsequently, two promotion review boards considered Herbert for promotion to full
colonel, and each board passed him over.7 After two unsuccessful reviews, he was forced to retire by operation of Army regulations.8 This might have all passed as a somewhat surprising
conclusion to an apparently successful career had it not been
for very serious charges leveled by Colonel Herbert against his
superiors.
In September 1970, almost eighteen months after his relief
from command, Colonel Herbert filed formal war crime charges
with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Army He alleged that he had witnessed several atrocities committed by
American soldiers or by Vietnamese in the presence of Americans. He later stated that he had attempted to file such charges
while he was still in Vietnam but had been unsuccessful in
getting anyone to pay any attention to him and to process the
allegations. In March, 1971, he expanded his charges to include
allegations that Colonel Franklin and General Barnes had been
informed by Herbert of the war crimes and atrocities, that they
had failed and refused to investigate them, and that they had
attempted to cover up his allegations. He further contended
that Colonel Franklin and General Barnes relieved him of command not for any dereliction of duty but because they were
The career history of Col. Herbert is described in Lando, The HerbertAffair,231
THE ATLANTIc MONTHLY 73 (May 1973) [hereinafter cited as The Herbert Affair], in
petitioner Herbert's brief to the Supreme Court, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979) and in Herbert
v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
5 See The Herbert Affair, supra note 4, at 74.
6 Id.

Id. at 73.
A.R. 635-120, ch. 11.
The Herbert Affair, supra note 4, at 74; Brief for Petitioner at 5, 99 S. Ct. 1635
(1979).
'
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annoyed by his attempts to prod them to conduct an investigation.' 0
Herbert's charges soon came to the attention of the American press and were the subject of a good deal of news coverage.
The publicity was generally favorable to Herbert and tended
to cast him in the role of a hero. The Army did not publicly
respond to the charges other than to say that they were under
investigation. The story told in the newspapers and over television and radio was essentially the story of Colonel Herbert
alone."
Meanwhile, the Army was conducting its own investigation. The CED issued a report in October, 1971, which completely exonerated both Colonel Franklin and General Barnes
from the charges leveled against them by Herbert. The Army's
report on the matter did not deny the possibility that war
crimes or other atrocities might have occurred, but it did directly refute Colonel Herbert's allegations that he had reported
such crimes and that his superiors had failed to investigate
them."1
Barry Lando, who had interviewed Herbert for the CBS
Evening News in the summer of 1971, became interested in
doing a follow-up story. He was curious about the Army's report and he was interested in hearing from persons other than
Herbert. 3 By this time, Lando was a producer for the CBS
documentary program, 60 Minutes. He arranged for and conducted a great number of interviews, including ones with the
principals, Herbert, Franklin, and Barnes, and did a significant amount of other research. Interviews to be telecast were
conducted by Mike Wallace, one of the correspondents for 60
Minutes. The work of Lando and Wallace became the basis for
10Id.
1 See Herbert

v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1977); The HerbertAffair,
supra note 4.
1 The HerbertAffair, supra note 4, at 75; Brief for Petitioner at 5, 99 S. Ct. 1635
(1979). At no time during this entire controversy has it been denied that some atrocities
probably did take place. The discrepancies have arisen with respect to Herbert's claims
about his charges and the alleged failure of his superiors to respond to them. For
instance, a particularly gruesome incident allegedly occurred on February 14, 1969,
and Herbert said he made an immediate report to Col. Franklin. There was evidence,
however, that Franklin was in Hawaii on the 14th. See The HerbertAffair, supranote
4, at 74, 77-78.
11Id. at 75. See also Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1977).
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a segment on 60 Minutes, entitled The Selling of Colonel
Herbert, which was broadcast February 4, 1973. The general
thrust of the program was that Colonel Herbert had not been
telling the whole truth. There may have been war crimes, but
there were significant questions of fact as to whether Colonel
Herbert had reported them prior to September 1970. In fact,
there was some evidence that Herbert might have participated
in war crimes himself. Herbert was one of the persons interviewed and he stood by his charges as they had been made. The
program also contained some critical discussion of Herbert's
book, Soldier, which had recently been published. 4 A few
months later Barry Lando published an article in The Atlantic
Monthly which repeated and elaborated on the basic points
covered in the 60 Minutes program.
In response to the 60 Minutes show and The Atlantic
Monthly article, Herbert filed a defamation action against
Lando, Mike Wallace, CBS, and The Atlantic Monthly. He
claimed damages for injury to his own reputation and to his
book Soldier as a literary property. 5
The discovery process began but soon became ensnarled in
discovery disputes. During the course of Barry Lando's deposition, his counsel instructed him not to answer questions pertaining to the exercise of editorial judgment by himself and his
colleagues at CBS. 6 There were several grounds of objection to
" One of the ironies of the Herbert litigation is that Herbert's publisher, Holt,
Rinehart & Wilson, is a subsidiary of CBS.
See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 982 (2d Cir. 1977).
Quoting from defendants' brief, the district court summarized the areas of
dispute as follows:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigation regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the "60
Minutes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state
of mind with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclusion with respect to persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included
or excluded from the broadcast publication;
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by the decision to include or exclude
material;
6. Conversations between Lando and source persons subsequent to the inception of this action;
7. Lando's activities as well as conversations between Lando, Wallace
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the questions,1 7 the most significant being that Lando was constitutionally privileged to refuse to answer questions directed
toward the exercise of editorial discretion. The plaintiff's lawyer moved to compel answers to the disputed questions. The
trial court granted the motion,'" but certified the issue for an
20
interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit,'" which reversed.
Herbert then successfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, 2 1 and the Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Second Circuit.2
The issue posed by the Herbert case was deceptively simple: Does a journalist in a Sullivan-rule libel case2 3 have a first
amendment right to refuse to answer pre-trial discovery questions directed toward the exercise of judgment in the editorial
process? 24 The thirteen2 judges who have thus far considered
and/or other CBS employees concerning Herbert or the "60 Minutes" segment between broadcast and publication of the Atlantic Monthly article.
Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Categories one through five are
the ones particularly pertinent to the editorial privilege question. Id. at 395.
11Lando's objections were premised on first amendment "editorial privilege," and
on grounds of relevance, 73 F.R.D. at 395-97.
'Id.
at 387-88.
Unreported order issued February 22, 1977. A copy is attached as Appendix C
to Herbert's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
21 The Court granted certiorari on March 20, 1978, 435 U.S. 922 (1978), and the
case was argued October 31, 1978. 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
2 99 S. Ct. at 1640.
1 A Sullivan-rule libel case is an action in which the plaintiff is a public official
or a public figure and must prove "actual malice" in order to recover. See Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally Eaton,
The American Law of Defamation through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond:
An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. Rv. 1349 (1975); Hill, Defamationand Privacy Under
the FirstAmendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205 (1976); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1221 (1976); Robertson, Defamation and the First
Amendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. Rv. 199 (1976).
2' The Second Circuit defined the problem as follows:
The seemingly narrow issue before us-the scope of protection afforded
by the First Amendment to the compelled disclosure of the editorial process-has broad implications. Called upon to decide whether, and to what
extent, a public figure bringing a libel action may inquire into a journalist's
thoughts, opinions and conclusions in preparing a broadcast, we must address initially the fundamental relationship between the First Amendment
guarantee of a free press and the teaching of New York Times v.
Sullivan. . . . In accommodating both these interests within our constitu-
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the issue have written nine separate opinions.21 The plethora of
opinions certainly suggests that the question is not as simple
as it may seem. The importance of the issue in libel litigation
can only be understood in the context of the evidentiary requirements imposed on plaintiffs in Sullivan-rule cases.
A public official or a public figure (Herbert is concededly
a public figure) 27 bringing a libel action must prove that the
defendant published a defamatory falsehood with "actual malice." 28 The meaning of "actual malice" is different from the
common law usage in that the phrase is not defined in terms
of personal animus, ill-will, hatred, or contempt. 21 Instead, the
actual malice standard for libel suits is related to the state of
mind of the defendant as to the truth or falsity of the statement
complained of, at the time it is published." If a plaintiff can
tional scheme, we find that due regard to the First Amendment requires that
we afford a privilege to disclosure of a journalist's exercise of editorial control
and judgment.
Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 975 (2d Cir. 1977).
2 Nine members of the Supreme Court, three members of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals and one federal district judge.
28 Justice White wrote the majority opinion for the Supreme Court and Justice
Powell wrote a concurrence. 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1650. Justice Brennan wrote an opinion
dissenting in part. Id. at 1651. Justices Stewart and Marshall each wrote dissents. Id.
at 1661, 1663. Judges Kaufman, Oakes, and Meskill of the Second Circuit all wrote
opinions. 568 F.2d 974, 975, 984, 995 (2d Cir. 1977). Judge Haight, the trial judge, also
published an opinion. 73 F.R.D. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
21See 73 F.R.D. at 391.
2' The actual malice test was applied to public official libel plaintiffs in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). It was extended to "public figures" in
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Plaintiffs who are neither public
officials nor public figures have to meet less stringent standards. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a time the focus was on the nature of the event
giving rise to a publication rather than on the status of the plaintiff. See Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). As to who is a "public figure," see, e.g.,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, U.S.
, 47 U.S.L.W. 4827 (June 26, 1979); Wolston
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.,__ U.S. , 47 U.S.L.W. 4840 (June 26, 1979); Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp.
600 (D.D.C. 1977), affl'd, 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Forrest v. Lynch. 347 So.2d
1255 (La. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
11Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). One commentator has suggested
that the Supreme Court was not altogether certain that it was redefining malice.
Eaton, supra note 23, at 1370 n.91.
10 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See also Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
731 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153-54 (1967); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
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show that a defendant had actual knowledge at the time of
publication that the statement complained of was untrue, he
may recover. Absent such a showing, the plaintiff must prove
the defendant published a defamatory falsehood with "reckless
disregard" for the truth or falsity of the statement. ' , Courts
have repeatedly held that "reckless disregard" implies much
more than negligence.32 The publisher must have entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of-the statement at the time of
publication."
Proof problems for the plaintiff in trying to meet the actual
malice test are compounded because the courts require actual
malice to be established not merely by a preponderance of the
evidence, but by clear and convincing proof.3 4 Some courts

have held that the clear and convincing evidence standard
must be applied even at the summary judgment level.35 Thus,
if a libel defendant moves for summary judgment, he is entitled
to prevail unless the plaintiff shows by clear and convincing
evidence that actual malice exists. This is a significantly
stricter standard than normally applied in summary judgment
1'New York Times

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727-31 (1968), the Court said:
[Rieckless conduct is not measured by whethek a reasonably prudent man
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing
with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
See also Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Dickey v. CBS,
Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D.Pa. 1977).
3 See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So.2d 1306 (La. 1978).
1' See, e.g., Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
aff'd 4 Media L. Rptr. (3rd Cir. 1978); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp.
600 (D.D.C. 1977) aff'd 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977) affl'd, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Nader
v. DeToledano, 3 Media L. Rptr. 1233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977); Keeton, supra note 23,
at 1228; Eaton, supra note 23, at 1374.
-"Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 167, 179 (D.D.C. 1977);
Nader v. DeToledano, 3 Media L. Rptr. 1233, 1234 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977); Note,
Public Official and Actual Malice Standards: The Evolution of New York Times v.
Sullivan, 56 IOWA L. Rav. 393, 401-02 (1970).
12
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proceedings'.1 The imposition of this strict burden of proof on
the plaintiff has been justified as necessary to protect robust
debate on public issues and to avoid a chilling effect on the
press and other persons engaged in the discussion of issues of
public interest. 7 Whatever the justifications, there is no doubt
the libel plaintiff in a Sullivan-rule case has a tremendous
burden of proof. 3
U
The plaintiff's position in Herbert was that direct testimony from the defendants was necessary for the determination
of the subjective state of mind of the publishers (Wallace,
Lando, and their respective employers), as to the truth or falsity of the statements published.3 9 Herbert argued that selective editing was done by Lando and Wallace to cause both the
television show and the article to portray him as a liar. 0 He also
contended that his own interview was edited so that questions
and answers were taken out of context." Herbert alleged that
the purpose of the program was to "get Herbert."4 He argued
that decisions about what to include in the program, what
order to show the material, what methods to use in interviewing, and the publisher's own motives were all relevant to the
3
question of actual malice.1
The defendants argued that there was a constitutional
privilege protecting the editorial process from intrusions by
See generally 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15 (2d ed. 1976).
3 Note, supra note 35, at 401. See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970).
11At least one court has suggested that in addition to all other hurdles, the plaintiff must convince the judge and the jury of actual malice. Thus a jury finding of actual
malice based on the evidence adduced at trial would not be enough for a plaintiff to
prevail. The judge must make a separate determination as a matter of law whether
the evidence supports a finding of actual malice. Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d
920, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970).
The Ninth Circuit has expressly rejected this approach. Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 940 (1975).
:'Brief for Petitioner at 9-19, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
, See, e.g., Herbert's complaint
26, 27, 28, 29.
41See, e.g., Herbert's complaint
26, 27, 28. Apparently it is a serious breach of
journalistic ethics to cut and splice so as to broadcast an answer to question "X" as if
it were a response to question "Y". See Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 142 Cal.
Rptr. 304, 311 (1977).
42 See, e.g., Herbert's complaint
26(e).
' Brief for Petitioner at 9-17, Petitioner's Reply Brief at 26, 99 S.Ct. 1635 (1979).
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third parties." They contended that malice could be proven by
circumstantial evidence without direct inquiry into the editorial process. 5 Such an inquiry, they argued, would have a
chilling effect on the free exchange of ideas and would tend to
make editors overly cautious in their exercise of discretion.
This would be an unconstitutional interference with open debate, free comment, and freedom of the press."
II.

A.

THE DECISIONS

The Second Circuit Opinion

By a vote of 2-1, the Second Circuit decided that Barry
Lando did have a privilege to refuse to answer questions inquiring into the editorial process, and thereby reversed the trial
7
court's order compelling answers to the questions in dispute.
The two judges forming the majority were in general agreement
on basic principles, but they filed separate opinions and their
rationales differed in significant ways.
Chief Judge Kaufman used the following argument to
reach the conclusion that Lando was protected by an editorial
privilege: (1) The Constitution protects the acquisition and
dissemination of information;" (2) The editorial process must
be safeguarded because the human judgment as to what information should be acquired and disseminated is inextricably
related to these two constitutionally protected functions;" (3)
Inquiries into the editorial process may restrain full and candid
discussions and thereby unconstitutionally restrict debate and
the dissemination of news. 0 In Judge Kaufman's view, discov" Brief for Respondent at 26-57, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).

"Id. at 63-66.
, Id. at 29-57.
" Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, (2d Cir. 1977).
568 F.2d at 976-78. Judge Kaufman was not on solid ground with respect to the
acquisition of information. Dissemination is certainly protected even if the means of
acquisition are questionable. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829 (1978). No case, however, has held that there is a constitutional right of
acquisition. Indeed, some decisions have clearly limited acquisition. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
" 568 F.2d 978-79.
Id. at 980. The fear is that editors and reporters would not be frank and would
tend to be overly cautious if they knew that their comments and decisions might be
subjected to later judicial review,
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ery procedures should be carefully limited to allow only those
which "least conflict with the principle that debate on public
issues should be robust and uninhibited."'- He was also of the
opinion that the malice issue might be determined from circumstantial evidence,52 in which case there would be no compelling need for direct inquiry into the editorial process.
Judge Oakes concurred with the conclusion and the general approach of Judge Kaufman, 3 but he explicitly based his
opinion on the idea of a "structural" protection for the press
derived from the free press clause of the first amendment. 5 He
concluded that a court order requiring Lando to answer questions would be a government-sponsored interference with the
press function. 5 As such, it could only be justified in the most
extreme circumstances. In the context of Herbert,Judge Oakes
believed that such an order could lead to self-censorship in the
editorial process and could be as damaging to the dissemination function as a prior restraint.56
Judge Oakes also relied on certain cases dealing with the
asserted right of reporters to maintain the confidentiality of
sources." Although no court has gone so far as to say there
exists an absolute privilege to refuse to identify sources, 8 therq
have been a number of cases in which courts have recognized
a qualified privilege to protect the identity of confidential
sources.59 The courts generally consider two factors in deciding
"Id.
52 Id. at 984.

"3Id. at 984.
Id. at 988.

Id. at 990.
Id. at 990-95. Prior restraints on publications can be justified only in limited
and extreme circumstances. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
51 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Baker v. F. & F. Investment,
470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389
F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
"' Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, argued that he should not
even have to-appear in response to a grand jury subpoena. This argument was rejected
by the trial court, which did recognize a qualified testimonial privilege. Application
of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The Ninth Circuit's reversal of the trial
court in Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), was subsequently
reversed by the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

5 See, e.g., Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v.
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whether reporters should be allowed to refuse to name their
sources: (1) the importance of the information requested; and
(2) the availability of the information from other sources. 0
Both Chief Judge Kaufman and Judge Oakes relied on
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo1 and CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 2 two cases in which the Supreme

Court made it clear that the government cannot directly interfere with the basic editorial decision about what to publish and
what not to publish. Both Tornillo and CBS involved direct
attempts to require the publication of certain material. In
Tornillo, the Court invalidated a Florida right to reply statute. 3 The Court held in CBS that the government was prohibited by the first amendment from requiring television licensees
to accept paid political advertisements. 4
Judge Haight, the trial judge who ordered Lando to answer
the questions in the controversy, focused primarily on the
heavy burden placed on the libel plaintiff and decided to follow
the usual approach of applying discovery rules liberally. 5
Moreover, he believed that direct testimony about the editorial
judgments of the defendants was particularly relevant to a determination of their states of mind as to the truth or falsity of
the statements when published,"6 even if requiring such testimony might interfere with the editorial process.
Judge Meskill, of the Second Circuit, dissented from the
majority result and basically followed the trial court's line of
reasoning. He elaborated on Judge Haight's rationale by arguMcCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973); Morgan v. State, 336 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1975);
Laughlin v. State, 323 So.2d 691 (Fla. 1975).
' See, e.g., Silkwood v. The Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977);
Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. 111.
1978); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 492
(E.D.Pa. 1977); State v. Stoney, No. 74-227, (11th Cir. Ct. Fla. 1974).
1 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
2 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
"See 418 U.S. at 256-58.
412 U.S. at 126-32.
Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
" Where, as here, the defendant's state of mind is of central importance
to a proper resolution of the merits, it is obvious that these lines of inquiry
may lead, directly or indirectly, to admissible evidence. . . .The publisher's
opinions and conclusions with respect to veracity, reliability, and the preference of one source of information over another are clearly relevant.
Id. at 395.
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ing that a libel suit is specifically intended to explore the
subjective state of mind of a publisher and, therefore, questions
such as those posed to Lando are central to proof of the plaintiff's case." He admitted that such inquiries might have a chilling effect on the exercise of editorial discretion, but, he argued,
the very purpose of a libel action is to chill the publication of
defamations6 5 He did not believe that allowing discovery of an
editor's state of mind would have any appreciably greater chilling effect on the dissemination of news and information than
allowing libel suits in the first place.69 He specifically rejected
Judge Oakes' argument that the press is protected as an institution by the Constitution. He stated two reasons: (1) There is
little, if any, case law precedent for the proposition; 0 and (2)
It would be dangerous to set such a precedent because the
institutional rights afforded to certain business firms engaged
in journalistic activities might be greater than personal individual rights otherwise protected by the Constitution or the
common law." Finally, Judge Meskill argued that Tornillo and
CBS only afford journalists editorial protection from governmental attempts to control the subject matter of publications;
therefore, such cases simply do not support the argument that
a Sullivan-rule libel plaintiff cannot discover the basis for certain editorial decisions. 2
B.

The Supreme Court Decision

Judge Meskill's opinion presaged the Supreme Court's
decision in the Herbert case. By a margin of 6-3,' 3 the Court
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and rejected the
arguments in support of the recognition of an editorial privilege
in libel suits. Justice White, who wrote the Court's opinion,
reasoned that the New York Times standard of actual malice
necessitates inquiries directed toward establishing the pub7 Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., dissenting).
11Id. at 995.
,9Id. at 995-97.
70 Id. at 996-97.
1,Id. at 997.
72 Id.

73The majority was comprised of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented.
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lisher's subjective state of mind.7 4 Further, he noted that evidence regarding the editorial process had been proffered and
admitted on behalf of both defendants and plaintiffs in many
libel actions, both before and after New York Times. 75 He
agreed with Judge Meskill that Tornillo and CBS were inapposite,7" and he was concerned that the recognition of the asserted privilege would create almost insurmountable problems
of defining its parameters. 77 Finally, he argued that the rules
of procedure grant to trial judges sufficient authority to prevent
abuses by limiting inquiries into the editorial process to those
which are clearly relevant.7 8 Justice Powell concurred in the
Court's opinion and judgment but added a short opinion to
emphasize that a trial court should take first amendment considerations into account in ruling upon discovery disputes, especially in deciding upon the relevance of specific inquiries.7
Justice Brennan, who dissented in part, argued for the
recognition of a qualified editorial privilege that could be overcome if a Sullivan-rule plaintiff were able to make a prima
8
facie showing of defamatory falsehood. 1
Justice Stewart dissented because he did not believe that
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals had addressed the
central question of whether the inquiries were relevant. In his
opinion, questions concerning the editorial process were simply
not relevant in Sullivan-rule cases:
The gravamen of such a lawsuit thus concerns that which was
in fact published. What was not published has nothing to do
with the case. And liability ultimately depends upon the publisher's state of knowledge of the falsity of what he published,
74 . .. New York Times and its progeny made it essential to proving
liability that plaintiffs focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant . . . Inevitably, unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the
thought and editorial processes of the alleged defamer would be open to
examination.
99 S. Ct. 1635, 1641.
11 Id. at 1641-43, nn.6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15.
71Id. at 1644-45.
1 Id. at 1646. In addition, Justice White noted that evidentiary privileges were
generally disfavored. Id. at 1648.
"I Id. at 1649.
7' Id. at 1650-51 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 1651 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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not at all upon his motivation in publishing it-not at all, in
other words, upon actual malice as those words are ordinarily

understood.'
Justice Marshall argued for the recognition of an absolute
privilege, but one which was considerably narrower in scope
than that recognized by the Second Circuit. He agreed that
individual "state of mind" inquiries were almost mandated by
the actual malice standard in Sullivan-rule cases, but he
thought that editorial discussions afid processes themselves
should be protected from detailed examinations allowed by
liberal use of the discovery rules."2
Several general observations can be made about the
Court's opinion and its possible ramifications: (1) The refusal
to recognize an editorial privilege was consistent with existing
case law and that refusal is itself unlikely to have any significant impact on libel defendants unless the Court has subtly
changed the actual malice standard; (2) The Court rejected
again an opportunity to accord special institutional privileges
to the news media under the free press clause; (3) The Court,
nevertheless, did not adequately consider the constitutional
implications of the kind of discovery processes in dispute in the
Herbert litigation. The following discussion elaborates upon
these general observations and suggests an alternate model for
the protection of the editorial process during discovery proceedings in libel cases.

III.

PROOF OF AcTUAL MALICE AFTER Herbert

The defendants in Herbert took a position that can be
charitably described as extreme. The burden of proving actual
malice is so great that Sullivan-rule plaintiffs almost invariably lose. s3 Indeed, few public official/public figure plaintiffs
survive a summary judgment motion." The recognition of a
Id. at 1661 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1663-66 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
13 See Eaton, supra note 23, at 1375.
m Id.; Frakt, The Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond, 6 RUT.-CAM. L. Rav. 471, 478-79 (1975).
Summary judgment is the preferred method for disposing of libel suits. See, e.g.,
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978); Bon Air Hotel v. Time, Inc.,
426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
52
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new and uncharted editorial privilege immunizing defendants
from discovery in certain significant areas could effectively
eliminate many such libel actions. Perhaps the first amendment demands the elimination of public official/public figure
defamation actions; some respected authorities have so
argued." But, if such actions are to be eliminated, they should
be ended forthrightly and for reasons of adequately justified
substantive law. They should not be eliminated in fact or in
law by the imposition of discovery restraints which make the
proof of actual malice unjustifiably difficult. The defendants
did not argue for any change in the substantive law of libel.
They sought, instead, a special evidentiary privilege that
would foreclose major areas from investigation and would
thereby remove from the case evidence that could be central to
the issues.
In a proper case malice may be proven with evidence extrinsic to the editorial process. Certainly in Herbert, the plaintiff does have alternative sources of information which he may
tap when the case begins again at the trial level. The plaintiff
could begin with the telecast and the article in question and
could interrogate every person mentioned or quoted. From
those depositions or interviews he could learn the nature of the
inquiries made by the defendants and could compare the responses of those persons to the attributions appearing in the
article or on the telecast. The plaintiff could also question any
other persons who might have knowledge of the factual background of the controversy. In this particular case, Colonel Herbert should not have much difficulty in identifying witnesses,
although that could be a problem for some Sullivan-rule plaintiffs. Upon proper request, the defendants should also produce
copies of unedited tapes or transcripts of interviews. 8 From
such sources, and from his own knowledge, Herbert and his
417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976); Spem v. Time, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa.
1971).
'* See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355-60 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170-72 (1967) (Black, J., concurring
and dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
' Objections might be raised if the tapes included confidential information or the
names of persons who did not want to be identified.
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lawyers could prepare an overall history which could be compared with the final product. This task would no doubt be
burdensome, but a comparison of available data with published data could go a long way toward establishing the plaintiff's case."
Nevertheless, the actual malice test is stiff, and in some
cases more than circumstantial evidence may be necessary. A
comparison of available data with published information may
support a prima facie case of negligence, even gross negligence,
but may be insufficient to show malice.88 Assume, for instance,
that Lando interviewed Smith and Jones, who were favorable
to Herbert, but neither Smith nor Jones was mentioned on 60
Minutes or in the Atlantic article. Assume further that Lando
did not interview Jackson or Thompson, both of whom support
Herbert's version of the facts. Herbert could prove the foregoing by deposing Smith, Jones, Jackson, and Thompson and by
introducing their testimony together with the article and the
telecast. That evidence could support a case for negligence or
even indifference to truth, but may not be "clear and convincing proof of reckless disregard for the truth"8 9 because it must
be shown that the publisher entertained a serious doubt
himself as to truth at the time of publication."
87 Although the failure to follow leads and contact available sources is not usually
enough by itself to prove malice, such evidence is admissible and relevant. See, e.g.,
Stevens v. Sun Publishing Co., 240 S.E.2d 812 (S.C. 1978), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945
(1978); Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Corp., 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); Akins v. Altus Newspapers 3 Media L. Rptr. 1449
(Okla. 1977). In some cases, circumstantial evidence of this sort may be enough to
prove malice. See, e.g., Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspaper, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Weaver v. Pryor Jeffersonian, 569 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1977); Sprouse
v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, (W.Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882
(1975).
" See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); Reliance Ins.
Co. v. Barron's, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1349, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), Chapadeau v. Utica
Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1975).
11New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
00See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); Stone v. Essex
County Newspaper, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 173-75 (Mass. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
op TORTS, 23 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975).
In at least one case, however, the cumulative effect of essentially circumstantial
evidence was enough to support a finding of malice. Alioto v. Cowles Communications,
Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For earlier history of this litigation, see 519
F.2d 777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975). But cf. Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 441
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Whether malice may or may not be provable with extrinsic
evidence, evidence as to the publisher's state of mind, the procedures followed in researching and editing a story, editorial
policy, and the publisher's attitude toward the plaintiff have
been introduced to prove or disprove actual malice in a variety
of cases." In Curtis Publishing-Co. v. Butts, 2 for instance,
there was evidence that the Saturday Evening Post had recently changed its editorial policy to one of "sophisticated
muckraking,"93 and that at the time of publication it was engaged in litigation with one of the principal figures in the disputed article. 4 There was also evidence that the Post assigned
a staff writer to the story who was unfamiliar with the subject
and that the Post conducted virtually no independent investigation, although it was not operating under any tight deadline. 5
The plaintiff in Weaver v. PryorJeffersonian,"1 a 1977 decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, successfully opposed a
motion for summary judgment on the basis of proof which included evidence of a strained relationship between plaintiff
and publisher as well as sloppy editorial procedures. 7 The deF. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (failure to investigate, plus apparent indifference as to
truth was insufficient to show malice).
"1 This fact was noted and cited in support of the Supreme Court's majority
opinion. 99 S. Ct. 1635, 1643.
388 U.S. 130 (1967).
,7Id. at 158.
"Id.
'7Id.
1 569 P.2d 967 (Okla. 1977).
' The plaintiff was involved in a hotly contested run-off election for sheriff. The
newspaper defendant printed a letter to the editor accusing plaintiff of misdeeds and
criminal acts during a previous term as sheriff. There was no attempt to verify the
allegations. The court said the fact of a strained relationship "taken together with the
content of the publications, the time of their publication with regard to the election,
the fact that appellee [was related by marriage to plaintiff's opponent] and the total
failure of appellees to make any inquiry into the truth of the inherently improbable
statements" was enough to preclude the grant of defendant's suinmary judgment
motion. Id. at 974. But cf. Guthrie v. Annabel, 365 N.E.2d 1367 (El. Ct. App. 1977)
(summary judgment for defendant, owner and publisher of a newspaper, for printing
his own letter inaccurately accusing plaintiff, a political candidate, of grand theft). See
also Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, Inc. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied
sub nom. Edwards v. New York Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Krauss v. Champaign
News Gazette, 375 N.E.2d 1362 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1978); Orr v. Lynch, 401 N.Y.S.2d 897
(App. Div. 1978); Dudley v. Farmer's Branch Daily Times, 550 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977); O'Brian v. Franich, 575 P.2d 258 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
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fendant prevailed in Reliance Insurance Company v. Barron's,11 but the court considered evidence detailing the editorial
procedures involved in the publication of the questioned article. " Editorial policy and editorial procedures formed the core
of plaintiff's successful action in Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc.,'"0 a 1977 decision of the West Virginia Supreme
Court which the United States Supreme Court refused to review. In a number of other cases precisely the kind of evidence
which Lando claimed to be constitutionally privileged has been
presented by both sides.' °'
In fact, the defendants themselves seemed to admit the
relevance of inquiries into the editorial process and the publisher's "state- of mind" in the Herbert case. The answers of
Mike Wallace, CBS, and Barry Lando all contained affirmative defenses asserting that the television program and the
Atlantic article were based on information from reliable
sources, that they were "fair and accurate," that the publishers
believed them to be accurate, and that they were published "in
good faith without malice."'' ° Such assertions, on their face,
*' 442 F. Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Id. at 1344-46.
211 S.E.2d 674 (W.Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975). For a sharp criticism
of Sprouse, see Anderson, A Response to ProfessorRobertson: The Issue Is Control of
Press Power,-54 TEx. L. REv. 271 (1976).
"I,
See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); Associated Press
v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir.
1977); Lake Havasu Estates, Inc. v. Reader's Digest Ass'n Inc., 441 F. Supp. 489
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Ryder v. Time, Inc., 3 Media L. Rptr. 1170 (D.D.C. 1977); Widener
v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1977). See the evidence
suggested as relevant in Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"I The Answer of Mike Wallace and CBS included as an affirmative defense the
following:
The matter complained of was based on information communicated to defendants by reliable persons and from reliable sources and was believed by
defendants to be true and a fair and accurate report of public and official
proceedings. Said matter was published by defendants in good faith, without
malice.
Answer of Defendants Mike Wallace and Columbia Broadcasting System, Third Defense, 25. Barry Lando's answer contained the following affirmative defense:
The publications charged to be defamatory were based on information communicated to defendant Lando by reliable persons and from reliable sources
and were believed by defendant to be true and a fair and accurate report
regarding the course and conduct of public and official proceedings, published by defendant Lando in good faith without malice, and said publica"

'
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seem to set forth a subjective state of mind defense which, one
presumes, might be proven by way of direct evidence. An affirmative defense of this sort, arguably, amounts to a waiver of
objections to inquiry into matters relevant to the defense.0 3
The recognition of an editorial privilege might have been of
little practical utility or benefit so long as defendants asserted
similar defenses to those of Lando and his colleagues. Certainly
most courts would take a jaundiced view of an argument that
plaintiff could not ask about "X" because of a privilege but
that defendant could use "X" freely in his defense. 04
So long as a public official or a public figure plaintiff must
prove actual malice as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan,
evidence concerning the process by which the article was published and the publisher's state of mind as to truth or falsity
will be relevant and should generally be subject to the discovery process. Justice Stewart argued strongly that such evidence
was not relevant:
As I understand the constitutional rule of New York Times
v. Sullivan, .

. inquiry into the broad "editorial process" is

simply not relevant in a libel suit brought by a public figure
against a publisher ....

The gravamen of such a lawsuit

tions are therefore privileged.
Answer of Barry Lando, Third Defense, 36.
"I Professor Moore has considered the question in an analogous context:
Thus assume that plaintiff sues on the alleged slanderous statement that
defendant had called him a Communist; the defendant pleads truth as an
affirmative defense; and on the taking of the plaintiff's deposition plaintiff
pleads his privilege against incrimination to a properly framed and relevant
question as to plaintiff being a Communist. Does not fairness demand that
defendant's affirmative defense be taken as true for the purpose of the
action?
4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.60[6] at 26-252 (2d ed. 1976). Professor Moore
answered his rhetorical question in the affirmative and cited as support Independent
Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), where a private
antitrust plaintiff was not allowed to assert a fifth amendment testimonial privilege
because, the court reasoned, -he had waived that privilege by bringing the suit.
,01Indeed, it can become dangerous to carry such an argument too far. During pretrial discovery proceedings in an Idaho libel case, a newspaper defendant refused to
identify some of its sources for the article in controversy and asserted the reporter's
privilege. Some sources were identified, but the trial court ruled that the refusal to
testify was evidence of malice, struck the newspaper's defenses, and entered a default
judgment for almost $2,000,000. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, 4
Media L. Rptr. 1689 (Idaho 1978).
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concerns that which was in fact published. What was not
published has nothing to do with the case."'°
Justice Stewart was simply wrong. If what was not published
contradicts what was published, and the publisher had knowledge of or ready access to the contradictory material, such
evidence would be directly probative of actual malice or reckless disregard.
Nevertheless, Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion did
make one very important point. The term "actual malice" is
very confusing because it has a different meaning in a libel
action from its meaning at common law."' Questions which are
aimed at showing hostility toward the plaintiff on the part of
the publisher are not relevant to proof of the defendant's state
of mind as to the truth or falsity of the publication. Great care
must be taken, therefore, to insure that discovery directed toward the editorial process and the publisher's state of mind
remains within the parameters of actual malice as defined in
New York Times v. Sullivan."7 It is not altogether clear that
Justibe White was as careful as he should have been in making
this distinction in Herbert. For instance, Justice White stated
that, "it is evident that the courts across the country have long
been accepting evidence going to the editorial processes of the
media without encountering constitutional objections."" 8 In
support of this statement he included a footnote citing a large
number of cases,' but every one of the cases cited antedated
New York Times v. Sullivan. Prior to Sullivan, libel cases were
decided by distinctly different standards. Whether or not preSullivan cases accepted evidence such as that at issue in
1- 99 S. Ct. 1661 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
106Id.
,07Justice Stewart stated:
. . ."Malice" as used in the New York Times opinion simply does not mean
malice as that word is commonly understood. In common understanding,
malice means ill will or hostility, and the most relevant question in determining whether a person's action was motivated by actual malice is to ask
"why." As part of the constitutional standard enunciated in the New York
Times case, however, "actual malice" has nothing to do with hostility or ill
will and the questior) "why" is totally irrelevant.
99 S. Ct. 1661 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 1643.
101Id., n. 15.
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Herbert would seem to be irrelevant unless there were some
close connection between the tests of liability employed before
and after Sullivan. One is left with the somewhat uncomfortable feeling that the current Supreme Court's understanding of
the Sullivan rule may be different from that of the Warren
Court. If that be so, then Justice Stewart's concerns are justified. The "actual malice" standard of Sullivan may be far from
perfect. It certainly seems to mandate inquiries into editorial
matters that at least the defendants in Herbert found to be
intrusive. The test has, however, provided a strong shield to
publishers from libel suits. If the test is to be changed, even
subtly, to something more akin to common law malice, then
much more intrusive questioning might be countenanced and
publishers could be put in the position of trying to defend their
beliefs and opinions, not just the veracity of their reporting.
IV.

MEDIA AND NON-MEDA LIBEL DEFENDANTSTHE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENT TREATMENT

0 made
The Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 11
1
several references to journalist defendants." ' These references
created the impression that Gertz might be read as indicating
a judicial tendency to treat press defendants differently from
non-press defendants in libel actions. This implication, combined with the developing idea of a separate institutional protection for journalists derived from the free press clause of the2
first amendment rather than from the free speech clause,"
gave Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit the basis for his deci-

sion to recognize an editorial privilege." 3 Although Judge Kauf-

man did not go so far as to adopt the rationale of Judge Oakes,
the result of the Second Circuit's opinion was, in effect, to
create a separate protection for press defendants not available
110
418 U.S.

323 (1974).

' Id. at 325, 347, 350.

,,2
See, Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731 (1977);
Nimmer, Introduction- Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add
to Freedom of Speech? 26 HAsTrNas L.J. 639 (1975); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26
HASnNGs L.J. 631 (1975). But see L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND PRESS iNEARLY AMEmcAN HISTORY (1960); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975).
,,3
Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 986-91 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring).
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to non-press defendants. An individual defendant simply does
not have "editorial privilege" to protect.
Basing the creation of a privilege on a separate institutional protection for the press is unwise and without sound
precedent. First, the determination of who is entitled to assert
a press privilege may often be difficult."' More importantly,
the focus in Sullivan-rule cases has been on the protection of
the free flow of communications rather than on the protection
of specified categories of defendants." 5 The press is certainly
one important means of communication, but it is not the only
one. Individuals and other non-media defendants obviously
may have comments to make from time to time about public
officials and -public figures which are just as deserving of protection as are news articles. Furthermore, a number of significant libel cases have involved individual defendants. Four of
the defendants in Sullivan were individuals."' Both St. Amant
"I The recognition of a qualified privilege for the protection of reporters' sources
has already created such problems. See United States v. John Doe (Appeal of Samuel
L. Popkin), 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972); Richards of Rockford, Inc., v. Pacific Gas and
Electric Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. John Doe (In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Served upon Leonard Rodberg), 332 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971);
United States v. John Doe (In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon Richard Falk),
332 F. Supp. 938 (D. Mass, 1971), affl'd, 445 F.2d 753 (1st Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); Note, Academic Researchers and the First
Amendment: ConstitutionalProtectionfor their ConfidentialSources?, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 876 (1977); Note, The Public Scholarand the FirstAmendment: A Compelling
Need for Compelling Testimony?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 995 (1972).
I's The justification for the Sullivan rule has usually been stated in terms of
protecting communications rather than specific communicators. For instance, in St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Supreme Court said:
But New York Times and succeeding cases have emphasized that the stake
of the people in public business and the conduct of public officials is so great
that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary care would
protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement First Amendment policies. Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the
First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability or further proliferation. But to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about
public affairs, it is essential that the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones. We adhere to this view and to the
line which our cases have drawn between false communications which are
protected and those which are not.
Id. at 731-32. See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
"I The four were civil rights activists in Alabama who were responsible, in large
measure, for the placement and content of the advertisement in question. The Supreme Court. made no distinction between them and the New York Times in the
application of the constitutional privilege.
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v. Thompson"' and Garrison v. Louisiana18 involved individual defendants. More recently, the Sullivan rule was applied
by the California Court of Appeals in Widener v. Pacific Gas
& Electric Company"' to the benefit of non-media defendants
in an action brought by, ironically, a media plaintiff.2 0 Both
precedent and the underlying rationale of the Sullivan line of
cases support the proposition that media defendants are not
entitled to any greater protection than non-media defen21
dants.' '
In addition, developments since Lando suggest that the
separate press freedom argument rests on shaky foundations.
Much of the recent comment in the area was sparked by an
address Justice Stewart delivered at the Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation in 1974, which was later published
in the Hastings Law Journal.2 2 Justice Stewart's views '23 came
" 390 U.S. 727 (1968).

379 U.S. 64 (1964).
' 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1977).
"0 The plaintiff was a television documentary producer who had been in charge

of preparing a documentary program on nuclear power plants. Engineers and officials
of a utility company, who were displeased with the way their company appeared in
the program, wrote a number of letters and conducted something of a campaign to
discredit the producer. He brought suit on the basis of some of the charges made
against him, and found himself faced with the hurdles of the Sullivan rule.
12' See Frakt, supranote 84, at 507-12. Non-media defendants have been afforded
the protection of the Sullivan-Gertz series in the following cases: Maheu v. Hughes
Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Bryan v. Brown, 339 So.2d 577 (Ala. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977); Williams v. Trust Co., 230 S.E.2d 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976);
Michaud v. Inhabitants of Town of Livermore Falls, 381 A.2d 1110 (Me. 1978); Marchesi v. Franchino, 387 A.2d 1129 (Md. Ct. App. 1978); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf,
350 A.2d 688 (Md. Ct. App. 1976); Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1977);
Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 377 A.2d 807 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1977);
Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Associated Fur Mfrs., Inc., 401 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div.
1978). But the applicability of Gertz and its predecessors to non-media defendants has
been questioned. See, e.g., Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (Ct. App.
1975); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54 (Ga. 1975); Devlin v. Greiner, 371
A.2d 380 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc. 541
S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976); Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 228 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. 1975).
These cases and others are collected and briefly summarized in PRACrIn G LAW INSTITtrrE, COMMUNICATONS LAw 1978, at 19-66 (1978).
M=Stewart, supra note 112.
23 The essence of his argument is contained in the following passage:
[T]he Free Press guarantee is, in essence, a structural provision of the
Constitution. Most of the other provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific liberties or specific rights of individuals: freedom of speech, freedom of
worship, the right to counsel, the privilege against compulsory self-
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under sharp attack in cases decided during the Supreme Court
term completed in the summer of 1978.
One of the significant decisions from the 1977 term was
FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti'24 in which the Court
held that corporations are entitled to first amendment protection as "persons." It was argued that only corporations engaged
in the communications business were entitled to first amendment protections, ' but the Court rejected that argument and
noted that individual corporations might have important views
to share with the voters on matters of particular interest to
them, matters about which a news corporation might have no
better information than anyone else.' 6 The Court's opinion did
not go so far as to suggest there was no basis for a separate
institutional status for press corporations or newspapers in genincrimination, to name a few. In contrast, the Free Press Clause extends
protection to an institution. The publishing business is, in short, the only
organized private business that is given explicit constitutional protection . ..
The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free press was
.. . to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an additional
check on the three official branches.
Id. at 633-34.
124 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Justice Stewart voted with the majority. Justice White
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, id. at 802,
and Justice Rehnquist dissented separately, id. at 822.
"2 At issue was a Massachusetts law which prohibited corporations from engaging
in various political activities that were clearly within the area of permissible activities
for individuals. Massachusetts argued that first amendment rights had only been
afforded to corporations engaged in the communications business and that a statutory
provision allowing comment on matters "materially affecting" a company was the
common denominator with the press cases. Id. at 781. In rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court said:
The press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role
of that institution in informing and educating the public, offering criticism,
and providing a forum for discussion and debate. . . . [T]he press does not
have a monopoly on either the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten. . . . Similarly, the court's decision involving corporations in the
business of communications or entertainment are based not only on the role
of the First Amendment in fostering individual self-expression but also on
its role in affording the public access to discussion, debate and the dissemination of information and ideas.
Id. at 780-83. For an article exploring the effects of Bellotti written by lead counsel for
the Bellotti appellants, see Fox, CorporatePoliticalSpeech: The Effect of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on CorporateReferendum Spending, 67 Ky. L.J. 75 (1978).
12- 435 U.S. 765, 782, n.18 (1978).
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eral. It simply said that corporations, as.such, were entitled to
first amendment rights as if they were individual citizens. The
implication, however, is that being in the communications
business does not in and of itself justify additional or particular
constitutional protections not afforded to other citizens.
Chief Justice Burger, who concurred in the Bellotti opinion
and judgment, filed a separate opinion in which he discussed
his understanding of the free press clause.' 27 His discussion was
not necessary to the decision, but it clearly pointed out his
disagreement with Justice Stewart and others who argue that
there is a separate institutional protection for the press. He
perceived two fundamental difficulties in establishing any institutional privilege. First, he was unable to find anything in
the history of the amendment or prior cases to prove that it was
the framers' intention to grant the press any greater rights than
those generally covered by the speech clause.' 21 Second, he
argued that it would be extraordinarily difficult to define the
scope of the status.' 9 Such a determination, he contended,
would necessarily involve government officials, particularly
judges, in analyses of the content of speech, the method or
manner of expression, the operation of a particular business,
and other matters which would intrude most dangerously into
areas of protected expression and would be more damaging to
free speech than the failure to recognize a special status.'30
Shortly thereafter, the Court decided Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily'3' and dealt a serious blow to the argument in favor of a
separate institutional privilege for the press. Following a clash
between police and demonstrators at a local hospital, a story,
accompanied by photographs, appeared in the Stanford student newspaper. The police obtained a search warrant to look
in the newspaper's offices for photographs and negatives of
suspects. There was no indication that anyone connected with
the paper was involved with the demonstration other than by
way of observation. The newspaper filed an action against the
police and the district attorney to enjoin the search on constitu1'

Id. at 795.

Id. at 798-801.
,2,
Id. at 801-02.
'3 Id.
13,436 U.S. 547 (1978).
"
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tional grounds.'32 The district court granted relief to the plaintiffs, holding: (1) a search warrant may not be issued as against
a third party not suspected of the crime unless there is probable
cause to believe that a subpoena duces tecum would be impracticable and (2) where the innocent party is a newspaper, the
first amendment makes a search permissible only when there
is a clear prior showing that, despite a restraining order, materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction.'3 3 The
Court of Appeals affirmed'14 and the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice White, reversed.'35 Before the Supreme
Court, the newspaper asserted that searches would be physically disruptive to its operation, that confidential sources of
information would tend to dry up, that reporters would be deterred from recording and preserving their recollections, that
the processing of news and its disseminatibn would be chilled,
and that the press would resort to self-censorship.' 6 Stating
that the general requirement of probable cause was a sufficient
protection against abuses, the Court determined that the warrants were properly issued.1 31 With respect to the first amendment arguments, Justice White concluded:
The fact is that respondents and amici have pointed to only
a very few instances in the entire United States since 1971
involving the issuance of warrants for searching newspaper
premises. This reality hardly suggests abuse; and if abuse
occurs, there will be time enough to deal with it. Furthermore, the press is not only an important, critical, and valuable asset to society, but it is not easily intimidated - nor
should it be.'38
Justice Powell created the majority necessary for reversal
in Zurcher by filing a separate concurring opinion. 3' He took
pains to point out that, unlike Justice Stewart, he did not
,32
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
'= Id. at 135.
, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
'= 436 U.S. 547 (1978).

,36
Id. at 563-64.The same considerations would apply in a case such as Lando.
,37
Id. at 563-67.
'"I Id. at 566. That there have been few abuses in the past is, of course, an insufficient justification standing alone for a refusal to protect against possible abuses in the
future.

"I9
Id. at"568-70.
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believe there is a structural privilege for the press.'4 0 His conclusion was based on essentially the same arguments as those
advanced by Chief Justice Burger in Bellotti.'4 ' Only Justices
Stewart and Marshall clearly advocated the recognition of an
institutional protection.' 4 The Zurcher decision was a clear setback for Justice Stewart's argument. The shift toward the Burger view, as expressed
in Bellotti, was also evident in several other decisions from the
spring of 1978.'1 3 Of particular interest was Houchins v. KQED,
Inc.,' in which the Court decided there is no constitutional
right of access to public information. None of these cases has
eliminated the argument that the press is entitled to institutional protection, but they do suggest that the precedential
support for the proposition is less than overwhelming. Coupled
with basic policy arguments against treating media and nonmedia defendants differently in Sullivan-rule libel actions, the
absence of general support for the position advanced by Judge
Oakes made it a tenuous basis on which to support the result
reached by the Second Circuit in the Lando case.
" Id. at 568, 570 n.3. It is important to note, however, that Justice Powell did

not say that the first amendment was wholly without application.
While there is no justification for the establishment of a separate Fourth
Amendment procedure for the press, a magistrate asked to issue a warrant
for the search of press offices can and should take cognizance of the independent values protected by the First Amendment-such as those highlighted
by Mr. Justice Stewart-when he weighs such factors.
Id. at 570.
435 U.S. at 795 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
" 436 U.S. at 570 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in Justice
Stewart's opinion.
"I One was Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In Nixon,

the Supreme Court denied the press access to the tapes used in the Watergate trial of

John Mitchell. In an opinion by Justice Powell (in which Justice Stewart joined), the
Court ruled that: (1) the common law right of access is not absolute but is subject to
the discretion of the trial judge in the management of a trial, and here the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act was an alternative statutory procedure for

gaining access; and (2) neither the first nor the sixth amendment compels access. The
Court specifically rejected the argument that the press has any greater right of access
than the public at large. Id. at 609.
1" 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE EDITORIAL PROCESS
A. Defendant's ConstitutionalInterests
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Herbertis consiitent with the standards of New York Times v. Sullivan, the
Court could have given more consideration to the protection of
the editorial process without unduly complicating the plaintiff's problems of proof.
Editing is one of the most important functions in the publication process. The pervasiveness of editing in the process
points out a significant problem: How would an editorial privilege be reasonably defined? Would associate producers and
television commentators be entitled to a privilege not available
to cub reporters? What about free-lance writers or stringers in
remote areas? What about the publisher of a political tract? To
ask these questions illustrates the dangers inherent in the fragmentation of the publication process and the attachment of a
constitutional privilege to some fragments but not to others. To
say that editorial discretion is privileged may imply that other
parts of the process are not so privileged. 45 That implication
would be an unduly restrictive interpretation of the scope of the
first amendment's protection. Instead of centering on one aspect, the focus of concern should be on the entire process from
the first lead to final publication. '
Because the ultimate writing or broadcast is protected by
the first amendment, the process by which that writing or
broadcast is put together should also be protected. It would
effectively destroy the protection afforded the publication were
,5 This point is similar to the concern expressed by Judge Meskill about recognizing a structural privilege for the press. See note 71 supra. Unless it is assumed that
the editorial process pervades the whole publication process, the recognition of such a
privilege does necessarily imply the creation of a hierarchy of interests. That is certainly true in a case such as this where Lando willingly allowed massive discovery of
his activities, interviews, research and so on, but objected to discovery concerning the
editorial process.
"I This approach is consistent with a comprehensive theory of the first amendment in which individual expression and all the necessary components thereof are the
general focus of protection. The means of expression may raise more serious questions
of regulation, e.g., talking as opposed to picketing. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (197.6). This approach is generally consistent with the theories advanced by
Professor Emerson. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION (1970).
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the government allowed, directly or indirectly, to interfere with
the process, including acquisition, writing, editing, revising,
deciding on lay-outs and headlines, and publishing. The television program and the article which are the basis of Herbert's
suit were put together by many different people doing many
different jobs. The work of them all was important to the creation of a constitutionally protected product. Lando and Wallace may have been the principals, but their involvement was
only one aspect of the overall process necessary to the creation
of the program.
The recognition of a general constitutional protection for
the publication process does not mean that it is or should be
free from all governmentally sponsored intrusions.'47 Actual
publications are not so protected. The publication of obscene
materials may be prohibited.' A newspaper may be held liable
for publication of a defamation,'49 or a story which invades
personal privacy.'50 Similarly, a reporter may be punished for
engaging in an illegal act to acquire information (e.g., breaking
and entering), although the publication of illegally acquired
information may not be punished."' The existence of a constitutional privilege, however, creates a presumption that intrusions by government are improper and that they can only be
justified by a showing of compelling need.' 52 A protection for
the whole process would protect the editorial functions which
are the concern of Barry Lando and would also protect other
functions without creating a hierarchy of confusingly defined
privileges attached to variouis functions. Such a model would
also incorporate the protection of confidential sources.
147Despite the arguments of Justice Black to the contrary, see, e.g., New York

Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293-97 (Black, J. concurring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29, 57 (Black, J., concurring), the Supreme Court has never
adopted an absolutist view of the first amendment.
"I See, e.g., Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
"' See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
'1 See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Company, 419 U.S. 245 (1974);
Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964); Barber v. Time, Inc.,
159 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. 1942).
"I See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978);
Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
5I See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
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Application of the Discovery Rules

Assuming that a rule of generalized protection were employed in the Herbert case, what would be the proper scope of
plaintiff's discovery of the defendants? The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure give trial judges great discretion in the control
of discovery. A litigant is entitled to very broad discovery subject to a general requirement of relevance." 3 Rule 26(b), however, specifically identifies four categories of information which
are not usually discoverable, even if relevant.'5 4 The two most
important in the current context are: (1) Information subject
to a recognized privilege'5 5 and (2) Information "otherwise"
protected "by order of court."'5 6 The first category applies to
traditionally recognized privileges such as those for communications between husband and wife, attorney and client, physician and patient, or priest and penitent. 5 7 There has been little
indication of a movement to broaden these categories,' 8 but
the reporter's privilege to protect sources has received some
judicial recognition as a privilege within the contemplation of
Rule 26(b).' 59 A trial judge has broad authority under Rule
26(c) to issue protective orders placing limits on discovery,
even in the absence of a recognized privilege." ' Thus, a trial
' See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) for the threshold criteria of relevance.
' The four categories excepted from the general discovery requirements are: (1)
information protected by a traditional privilege such as that between attorney and
client, id. at 26(b)(1); (2) trial preparation materials, id. at 26(b)(3); (3) information
obtained in a physical or mental examination unless specifically authorized in exceptional cases, id. at 26(b)(4); and (4) the discovery of information which is "otherwise
limited by order of court," id. at 26(b).

Id. at 26(b)(1).
,s' Id. at 26(b).
,' See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2020 (1970
'

ed.).
Id. at 178.
See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Baker
v. F. & F. Investment Co., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973); Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976);
Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
"I FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 157, §§ 2007,
2036. Whether a judge would use this authority is, of course, a different question
altogether. Merely arguing that the information is available from other sources may
not be enough, for instance, to justify a protective order. See Blankenship v. Hearst
Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975); Wright v. Patrolmen's Benev. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 161
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
'5'
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judge has the authority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to control discovery so that it is not unreasonably burdensome and does not unduly intrude into the process of publication.
Although libel plaintiffs are entitled to fairly extensive
discovery because of their onerous burden of proof, they are not
entitled to discover anything and everything about the publication process from the defendants themselves. The Sullivan rule
is intended to protect open and robust debate by freeing publishers from the fear of libel suits by public officials and figures
except in egregious circumstances.' 1 That purpose is defeated
if a Sullivan-rule plaintiff is given free rein to wander through
the files of a newspaper, to take reporters off their jobs for days
at a time, and to cause defendants to suffer the costs of enormous legal fees.
Proof of actual malice is so difficult that a defendant in a
Sullivan-rule case will usually win on the merits. 6'The victory
may be a Pyrrhic one, however, if discovery procedures have
been disruptive and expensive. The mere threat of litigation,
with its attendant costs in time, energy, and money, may have
a significant chilling effect even if a victory on the merits is
likely and even if no direct inquiries into editorial decisionmaking are allowed.'63 On the other hand, libel defendants cannot simply be immunized from discovery. A balance must be
struck between giving the plaintiff a fair chance to try to prove
his case and protecting the publication process from unreasonably and unnecessarily chilling invasions.6 4
"I New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
,' See Eaton, supra note 17, at 1375.
,,3Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (analogous "chilling effect" in the securities area); 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAMCTICE 26.02 (2d
ed. 1976); Note, The Emerging DeterrenceOrientationin the Imposition of Discovery
Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1033 (1978); Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117 (1949).
"I The balancing is between freedom of speech and freedom from speech which
are placed at odds in the context of an adversarial system. As one commentator has
noted:
Gertz, like all of the New York Times series of decisions, attempts to reconcile mutually irreconcilable values: the polity's interest in free and full interchange of potentially useful information and ideas, and the citizen's interest
in freedom from destructive invasions of his reputation, relationships and
personality. Each time the law furthers one of these inherently incompatible
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So long as the test for malice remains the same, the protection of the publisher's, as well as the plaintiffs, interest must
be accomplished through a careful and reasonably sophisticated application of the discovery rules by the trial judge. The
invocation of the general rule that liberal discovery is to be
allowed is not enough. In order to protect the publishing process courts must focus on the entire process by which the finished product is created. The focus on that process should not,
however, be fragmented or narrow. The whole process is important to the creation of the publication. In a given case an inquiry directed toward editorial policy might be considerably
less intrusive and disruptive than inquiries directed toward the
means of acquisition, including the identification of sources.
The role of a headline writer or a layout editor may be important to one case but not to another. There may be plenty of
extrinsic evidence available to one plaintiff, but another's case
may be premised almost entirely on the exercise of editorial
discretion by a publisher as to the content, timing, and placement of a particular story. Necessarily there must be varying
approaches, but courts could follow general guidelines such as
the following:
1) The process of publication from the earliest stages of
acquisition through actual dissemination is generally entitled
to constitutional protection.
2) The plaintiff's discovery in a Sullivan-rule libel action
should be directed first toward the accumulation of thirdparty and objective information, the acquisition of which
does not interfere with the publication process.
3) Some inquiry into the publication process may be routinely allowed. For instance, unless there are confidentiality
problems, the publisher should be expected to provide the
names of sources and other information such as unedited
interview transcripts or tapes, copies of the publications or
broadcast films or tapes in question, and similar items essential to a consideration of the principal issues. Usually, requests for such materials would not be unduly burdensome.
4) Discovery of other than "routine" information should not
values the other suffers.
Robertson, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 Tax. L. REv. 199, 200-01 (1976).
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be allowed unless the court determines that alternative
sources are unavailable and that the information requested
is central to proof of the plaintiff's case or unless the defendant uses such information defensively.
In many Sullivan-rule cases the discovery of matters generally covered by what Lando asserts as an editorial privilege
would be allowed under the foregoing guidelines. The actual
malice standard makes such a result almost inevitable. The
only alternative (if libel suits are to be allowed at all) is to
change the test so that it is related more to objective rather
than subjective concerns. It may be argued that the real concern should be with individual protection against careless publication procedures. An ignorant or an indifferent publisher is
now protected equally with the most careful one, and in fact,
the latter may be in greater danger if he has done enough
research to have sown a few seeds of doubt. Nevertheless, there
could be real dangers for journalists in moving to a more objective test. Allowing juries to draw inferences from circumstantial evidence could lead to uncertainties and the possible de
facto application of a negligence-based test. The subjectivity of
the current Sullivan test does provide libel defendants with
substantial protection from liability for the good faith publication of statements later determined to be erroneous.'6 5
CONCLUSION

The subjective nature of the Sullivan test may often necessitate some inquiries into the exercise of editorial discretion
during discovery, but the test does provide defamation defendants with significant and important protections. The Supreme Court was right to reject the editorial privilege created
by the Second Circuit. It could have unnecessarily fragmented
the entire publication process. There is adequate flexibility in
the discovery rules for a trial judge to afford all necessary pro"' If a defendant submits affidavits or other evidence in support of a go9d faith

defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to disprove by clear and convincing evidence
the defendant's prima facie case of no malice. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Proxmire, 579
F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978); Hoffman v. The Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600
(D.D.C. 1977); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977);
Nader v. DeToledano, 3 Media L. Rptr. 1233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977); Kidder v. Anderson, 354 So.2d 1306 (La. 1978).

822
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tections to a libel defendant without the necessity of creating
a new uncharted privilege. Nonetheless, courts should always
bear in mind that publishing-and all that goes with it-is
constitutionally favored and should be accorded the greatest
possible deference consistent with the protection of other individual interests.

